26 January 2023 in Dossier Powder Keg Russia, Military


More than ten years after the bloody end of Muammar Gaddafi’s dictatorship, Libya continues to be a nation split in two: on the one hand the pro-Western government in Tripoli, led by Fayaz Al-Serraj, and on the other hand the pro-Russian government of General Haftar, which controls 90% of Libya’s oil wells and thus constitutes a serious problem for the energy policy of the entire West, especially after the application of international sanctions against Russia. Yet Haftar, before returning to Libya to fight against Gaddafi, lived for 20 years just a few metres from the CIA headquarters in Virginia and was considered a trusted ally of the West – yet another US miscalculation.

In these lines, we give a possible explanation for this error: Haftar was educated and trained as a military man and spy in the Soviet Union, in an elite school close to the KGB, and subsequently continued to collaborate with the Russian intelligence services, whether he lived in America or in Libya. Today, Haftar is not only a military man who, in the name of and on behalf of Russia and the United Arab Emirates, prevents the West from reuniting Libya and gaining free access to oil, but he is also the head of a network of characters who, scattered around the world, manage the smuggling of hydrocarbons, weapons and migrants, and move immense amounts of money offshore – money that, printed at the behest of the Moscow government, pervades Libya and allows various rebel groups to remain active and arm themselves, and increases the personal wealth of this spy who, as in John Le Carré’s famous novel, lives on the edge of the Sahara desert, but in reality has come from the Moscow frost.

The spy school in Solnechnogorsk

1978: Vystrel School officers before field exercises in Egypt[1]

Between 1977 and 1978, Haftar attended ‘Vystrel’ senior officer courses in Solnechnogorsk, a small town 50 km from Moscow that was occupied by a German panzer army for a long time in World War II[2]. In the courses, political and command personnel at the regiment-brigade level of the Army were retrained in tactics, small arms, tactical and firearms training methodology. The school has a great tradition, dating back to the special sniper courses established in 1929[3].

After the participation of Vystrel volunteers in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Vystrel opened a training course for foreigners in 1974, which was also open to UN military observers[4]. Haftar was confronted with Stalin’s theory that Cyrenaica, according to the secret Yalta Agreements, should have been granted to the USSR – a promise later broken by the West, much to the anger of the Soviet dictator, who vowed to take back, sooner or later, what had been wrongfully taken from him[5].

The training programme included nine academic disciplines: history of UN peacekeeping operations, military engineering training, basics of observation, functional tasks of UN military observers, etc. The future observers studied in English the rules of radio communication, driving in adverse conditions, and the traditions and customs of different nations. The training culminated in a 10-hour field exercise, and has remained famous for preparing some of the best officers and specialists from the headquarters and militias deployed in the field by UN forces[6].

Since the 1990s, Vystrel has also trained foreign officers, and the school has earned honours such as the Order of the Warsaw Treaty Countries, that of Cuba, the People’s Republic of China, Mongolia and others[7]. Officers from armies around the world have been trained at Vystrel, including Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam, Mongolia, India, Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua and North Korea[8].

From 1969 to 1985, the director of Vystrel is a fervent communist of Jewish origin, General David Abramovich Dragunsky, twice awarded Hero of the Soviet Union[9]. From the creation of the Anti-Zionist Committee on 21 April 1983 until his last day (12 October 1992), Dragunsky was the undisputed head of this organisation and was the man who chose officers from African countries for their loyalty to the Soviet Union and their flexibility in adapting even to espionage roles in Western countries[10].

May 1991: Senior General Dragunskiy reviews a Soviet Air Force unit[11]

There are few organisations in the world that have done so much to discredit the state of Israel as an anti-Zionist committee: according to its founders (the propaganda department of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the KGB), Zionism must first be fought by the Jews themselves[12]. The underlying aim was to prevent, or at least limit, the emigration of Russian Jews to Israel, in order to prove that there was no ‘Jewish question’ in the country of victorious socialism. A purpose for which Dragunsky toured the countries allied with the USSR for years to build similar organisations there[13].

Dragunsky participated in the training of terrorists and foreign fighters who fought against Israel. A certificate was found on a terrorist killed in the Lebanon War (1982) confirming his training at the ‘Vystrel’ senior officers’ course, personally signed by Colonel Dragunsky[14]. In the summer of 1988, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee decided to dissolve the Anti-Zionist Committee and to establish the Society of Jewish Culture in its place. The old general continued his career, and the organisation he headed survived[15].

The Vystrel School, at least from 1983 onwards (i.e. from the time when the former head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, became head of the PCUS[16]), was integrated into Moscow’s espionage and military training projects abroad, with special reference to all those countries, in Africa and the Middle East, where US influence was preponderant – a project that fits in perfectly with the contiguous careers of General Dragunsky and General Haftar[17]. During those years, Haftar learned English and Russian. To this end, in 1983 he attended courses at the Frunze Academy in Moscow[18], an institute of military education and higher intelligence established in 1918. The school was transformed into the Combined Arms Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Between 1982 and the head of the academy was Gennady Ivanovich Obaturov[19] – a Soviet army general who participated in the suppression of the 1956 Hungarian uprising and the Vietnam War (1979), who died in April 1996[20]. David Dragunsky, in his youth, also attended the Frunze Academy, and after him many of the officers who, over the years, maintained and nurtured contacts with foreign officers trained in their classrooms, did the same – like Khalifa Haftar, in fact[21].

In the service of Washington and Paris

From left: Haftar prisoner of war in Chad, CIA consultant in Virginia, warlord in Cyrenaica[22]

Khalifa Haftar fled his country over 30 years ago after leading Libyan military operations in Chad between 1986 and 1987, where he was taken prisoner[23]. After a period of training in Langley, he formed a militia of half mercenaries, half Libyans in exile, financed by the US and called the National Critics Front[24] – an organisation that was then the basis, in 2011, for his return to Libya at the head of a combat unit of ‘revolutionaries’[25].

His participation in the war in Chad as commander of the Libyan forces was due to the fact that, already in his school years, Haftar and Gaddafi had befriended each other and then joined the army together[26]. When, in the 1980s, Libya tried to overthrow the N’Djamena government, Gaddafi chose a personal friend of his to lead unofficial militias in an action that ended in a crushing defeat and the arrest of all officers[27]. At that point, Gaddafi disowned Haftar and thereby gained the latter’s eternal enmity. Freed by the Chadian army, Haftar was recruited by the CIA and went to live, with his entire family, in Virginia[28]. Over the years, Haftar was paid so well that he managed to amass a fortune of over 8 million dollars[29] – a fortune that, in 2019, was moved to the United Arab Emirates following two class-action lawsuits brought by several families of victims of his paramilitary activities[30].

In 1989, Valery Velichko[31], head of the 9th Directorate of the KGB, responsible for the protection of senior state officials, was sent to Libya to implement Gaddafi’s personal security. At the time, the colonel had just decided to replace the female guards with male ones – but on one condition: all the guards had to be his direct relatives. These people had never dealt with security or protection before. And Velichko was to turn young Sorbonne graduates into experienced soldiers in just six months, a task he was given because it is one of the contacts Haftar still maintains with the Soviet Union[32].

The fact remains that, although Haftar continues to have excellent contacts with the Soviet Union (and the KGB) first, and with the Russian Federation (and the GRU) later, so much so that Putin supported him in Cyrenaica against the military forces of the entire West, he has also been a CIA agent since 1988. The list of so-called ‘double agents’ of the GRU and the CIA, who in the 1990s, after being trained at the Frunze Academy went to operate in America for Langley, is very long and full of famous incidents[33]. That is not all. On the pictorial palette of present-day Libya, nothing is what it seems. Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeibeh, for example, a businessman with ties to Turkey who has climbed to the top of the Al-Sarraj government hierarchy, is also well liked in Moscow[34].

As for Haftar, in addition to working for the Russians and Americans at the same time, he has also gone out of his way to support French interests, which are in any case behind the financing of the armed revolution against Gaddafi[35]. After the deposition of the dictator, a corridor for migrants fleeing from sub-Saharan Africa was opened via the Niger-Libya border, which was used by Haftar as a tap to regulate the influx of migrants at will and thus blackmail the European Union[36].

Today, instead of criminal gangs, that corridor is directly managed by Russian mercenaries from Wagner[37]. Thanks to President Hollande, who in 2016, during the crisis arising from the murder of Giulio Regeni, both these soldiers and Haftar, as well as Egypt, obtained French arms supplies in defiance of the international embargo[38], as in return Haftar promised to support the French militias in Chad – the same ones he had led to failure about a decade before the Libyan revolution[39]. All this with the approval of the US federal administration, which at the time of the agreement was headed by Donald Trump, a long-time sponsor of Haftar[40]. From those years is the birth of the French network of Libyan oil smugglers, run by the Eninco Trading group and its management members, all French[41].

Putin and Haftar

Libyan national army counts on Russia’s help to lift UN embargo[42]

Putin began revitalising ties with Libya soon after becoming president in 2000 and relations improved significantly after his meeting with Gaddafi in Tripoli in 2008. Shortly afterwards, Moscow cancelled most of Libya’s debt of almost USD 5 billion in exchange for oil, gas, arms and railway contracts. Gaddafi also granted the Russian fleet access to the port of Benghazi[43].

According to the official version of the history of the Libyan civil war, Khalifa Haftar reportedly asked for Moscow’s support around 2015. Haftar and his army need weapons, which cannot be imported due to the UN embargo[44]. In return, Haftar guarantees Russia the energy deals and access to ports he wants. Also thanks to Russian support, in 2016 Haftar conquered the ‘oil crescent’, i.e. Libya’s main oil ports[45]. Putin provides Haftar’s Tobruk government with military advice, diplomatic support at the UN and even printed money[46].

Haftar, to seal the deal, has made several trips to Moscow since 2016[47]. In 2016, Field Marshal Abdel-Basit al-Badri’s envoy, MP Aqila Saleh and Haftar himself visited Russia for meetings with senior officials[48]. Libya’s demands were officially announced by the head of parliament, Aqila Saleh in mid-December 2016. “We have been promised that the Libyan army will receive weapons and Russia will engage with the UN Security Council on this issue,” he says, and adds that Libya calls on Russia “to resume and continue work on oil and gas sites[49].

In January 2017, Haftar visited the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov, returning from Syrian waters[50]; in the same year, Moscow transported dozens of Haftar’s wounded soldiers to Russia for treatment[51]. In November 2018, the commander visited Moscow again[52] to meet with Russian Defence Ministry chief of staff Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, head of the Russian General Staff and Military Intelligence Service (GRU) – an in against which businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of the private military company Wagner, is also present. After the meeting, about two thousand of Wagner’s Russian mercenaries are deployed in Libya – Wagner not only supports Haftar’s army in the fighting[53], but also supplies it with weapons, ammunition and drones[54]. In addition to these, there are several GRU secret agents, who are now operating in both parts of Libya as advisors to Haftar’s army[55].

Together with Wagner and GRU men, Russia sends the 5th Spetsnaz Brigade to Tobruk – a troop of Belarusian soldiers specialised in warfare against irregular militias, acting under the command of the GRU and the Russian Ministry of Defence[56]. At the same time, the press reports the growing presence of Russian trainers and obscure private military companies in Libya, often hired to protect oil assets and provide advice[57] (many of the experts have lately been moved to Ukraine)[58]. In October 2018, the British newspaper The Sun revealed that Russia had sent several dozen officers from the GRU military intelligence service and the Spetznaz special forces wing to Libya, along with heavy weapons, to support Haftar. Two Russian military bases are already operational in the coastal cities of Tobruk and Benghazi, under the cover of Wagner’s mercenaries[59]. The Russian embassy in London denies[60].

In 2020, the Moscow Times reports that Russian contractors wounded in Libya and Syria are being treated in a private clinic in Moscow, whose owners include Maria Vorontsova, President Putin’s daughter, with her ex-husband[61], the former Dutch Gazprom manager Jorrit Joost Faassen[62]. After the divorce, he returned to the Netherlands, where he owns a small oil well drilling equipment company[63] with only one contract: with the Libyan-Russian oil and gas joint venture that has been operating in Benghazi since April 2019[64], the Libyan Russian Oil & Gas Joint Company[65].

Satellite photo of a Russian military base in Cyrenaica[66]

Although siding with Haftar, Moscow has also built ties with the government of Fayez al-Sarraj[67]. This two-faced approach is consistent with Putin’s regional strategy of acting as a mediator. Haftar’s refusal to renounce American citizenship and his general reputation as a difficult partner have also contributed to Moscow’s two-pronged approach. For their part, Russian military companies engaged in Cyrenaica have recently criticised Haftar and tried to re-establish relations with Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam[68], who has meanwhile become a powerful man on the jagged Libyan chessboard. Putin has two objectives[69]: Firstly, to control the oil and gas fields (most of which are in Haftar’s hands) and, secondly, to build a military base on the country’s coast, as Stalin dreamed[70]. At the same time, Moscow modernises naval and air bases in Syria, in Tartus and Latakia[71]. The goal of opening a new front against NATO is obvious[72].

In May 2020, the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) claims that Moscow flew several MiG-29 fighters to support Russian mercenaries fighting for Haftar. AFRICOM commander General Stephen Townsend says the planes made their first stop after departing Russia in Syria, where they were “repainted to disguise their Russian origin” before arriving in Libya[73]. According to the UN, between 8 July and 2 September 2020 alone, 70 military transport planes landed on airfields in eastern Libya[74].

In July 2021, Russian regular troops are near the Jufra airbase in the west of the country. Copies of the documents (photographs and coordinates) were handed over to DHRF (Democracy and Human Rights Foundation) members of the US, EU, UK and Libyan governments. “Although Russia has been stationing Wagner fighters in the country since at least 2017, the deployment of regular Russian military forces is a clear escalation with serious implications for the national security of Libya, the United States and the European Union. Furthermore, the presence of troops makes it clear that Russia has no intention of leaving Libya any time soon, and excludes the possibility of free elections[75].

The elections were cancelled due to the instability in the country[76]. From then on Libya is in chaos again – with a profound difference: since Russia has been hit by international sanctions due to the invasion of Ukraine, the independence of Cyrenaica and the political and military survival of Haftar have passed into the hands of the United Arab Emirates[77].

Libyan oil smuggling

Libyan oil smuggling scheme run by Maltese trustees[78]

Between spring 2014 and summer 2015, the Swiss company Kolmar Group AG Zug bought smuggled fuel from Libya, transported by the Enemed Company Ltd. Valletta: over 20 shipments worth more than $11 million. The operation is run by smuggler Fahmi Slim Ben Khalifa and Maltese nationals Darren Debono (former footballer[79]) and Gordon Debono[80]. The oil was cleared into Malta despite the fraudulent certification of Fahmi Slim’s Tiuboda Oil Refining Company[81] and the numerous protests by Libyan leaders over the smuggling of fuel into Malta[82]. The Ras Hanzir and Has Saptan tanks were leased to Kolmar after the Swiss company made a public bid for storage, and marine diesel was delivered by vessels chartered by Gordon and Darren Debono[83].

In October 2017, the Debonos were arrested by the Italian police and placed under house arrest (Darren Debono is also involved in the investigation into the murder of journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia, who was working on the smuggling of hydrocarbons[84]). Fahmi Slim was arrested in Libya after losing the protection of Ali al Gatrani[85], chairman of the economic committee of the House of Representatives[86]. In February 2018, the United States placed Debono on the sanctions list for ‘threatening the peace, security or stability of Libya’ through his smuggling activities: ‘The action covers 21 companies controlled by Darren and Gordon Debono and three other companies involved in the illicit exploitation of crude oil or other natural resources in Libya, including the illicit production, refining, brokering, sale, purchase or export of Libyan oil’[87].

Some time after his arrest in Italy, Darren Debono was released on bail and in November 2018 he was allowed to return home[88]. Russia blocked the sanctions requested by Malta[89], after which the Maltese Foreign Ministry stated that the government no longer intended to prosecute Debono[90]. The investigation, however, continues[91]. It is thought that Russia may have used Malta’s Satabank to make ‘covert payments’, used to finance the smuggling of fuel to blacklisted Syrian military forces or to Khalifa Haftar’s army[92]. Satabank was founded in 2014 by Bulgarian entrepreneur Hristo Georgiev. In October 2018, the Malta State Financial Services Authority (MFSA) accused the bank of illegal money laundering. The authorities banned the bank from accepting cash deposits[93] and fined it EUR 3 million[94], for which it ceased operations.

The network built by Darren and Gordon Debono is based on three parallel groups, one of which is responsible for transporting the oil from Libya to the buyers’ terminals, and the other two for filtering payments so that they can secretly pay those who pull the strings of the smuggling itself. The holding company involved in transport and distribution is KB Investments Ltd. St. Julians (Malta), which in turn controls seven Maltese companies in charge of the storage, transport by ship, and networking of oil[95]. The second holding company, Inovest Ltd. Birkikara (Malta) is in charge of reinvesting revenues in military equipment and weapons[96]. The third, which is still active, and whose operational arm is Petroplus Ltd. St. Juliens (Malta), has been moved to the Emirates and operates under the control of a new holding company administered by Yvette Debono – Gordon’s wife: IPIL International Properties and Investments Limited Dubai[97].

Yvette and Gordon Debono, trustees of Haftar’s hidden wealth in Dubai[98]

The latter, over the past two years, due to pressure from the investigations of the Maltese judiciary, has done what it could to conceal the siphoning off of money from Darren and Gordon Debono’s already identified companies to new contractors acting under the umbrella of the new Emirates holding company – such as Eninco Trading Ltd. Valletta[99], and which after being discovered by Maltese magistrates moved its business to the UK, where Eninco Trading Services Ltd. London, which has a turnover of over £370 million (2021) and operates for Eninco’s customers in Malta[100], namely Fleet Energy Ltd. Dubai[101].

The owner of the entire group is French businessman Jeremy André Gustave Tchicaya-Anguile[102], who is the owner of the trading company Cheyne Petroleum Ltd. Calabar (Nigeria)[103] and Pillar Resources Ltd. London[104] – a businessman who came out of nowhere after being involved in dentistry in France for almost 25 years[105]. Fleet Energy’s address[106] is still the same as General Haftar’s headquarters for his espionage activities, which has been located in Dubai for almost 15 years[107]. At the same address is domiciled IPIL, which according to the records of the oil smuggling investigations is the receptacle that pocketed, through a complex system of sham business processes with companies in the Virgin Islands and Belize, the money (around 2.8 million dollars) that would now be in Haftar’s direct possession[108].

The money for Haftar

The Libyan 1 Dinar banknote, printed in Moscow by the Russian Goznak mint[109]

The first time Libyan money (more than 4 billion dinars in 5-, 10- and 20-dinar paper money) was printed in Moscow was in June 2016, prompting the obvious negative reaction from both the government of Fayez al-Sarraj and almost all Western powers[110]. Al-Sarraj has since calmed down, and representatives of the Libyan central bank, both in Tripoli and Baida, have remained neutral[111]. In 2017, Libyan money (the new 1 dinar coins) was minted in Russia at the request of the eastern branch of the Central Bank, which is controlled by the interim government in Baida, the Tobruk House of Representatives, which is supported and at the same time backed by Haftar. The most popular 1 dinar banknotes (as well as the ‘half dinar’ and ‘quarter dinar’) proved to be the most worn, so it is logical to assume that the minting of the coins was decided already at the stage of the banknote production preparations[112].

The new currency, ordered by the Tobruk branch of the Central Bank, is distributed throughout the country, without restrictions, and is a great success[113]. As of 2016, in substantial agreement between the parties, two banknotes circulate, with identical value, part of which are produced by the Russian state mint, Goznak[114]. This means that Russia is able to print and smuggle absolutely legitimate money whenever it wants and in the necessary quantities.

In September 2019, two 2000 cubic foot containers full of Libyan currency destined for Haftar’s government and originating from the Russian mint Goznak were seized in Valletta[115]. Since 2016, the eastern government has printed billions of Libyan dinars in Russia, much of which has been used to finance the LNA and its war efforts. Security sources familiar with the situation say that the cash has spread like wildfire and has become impossible to control[116]. In May 2020[117], Maltese authorities seized another cargo of Libyan currency worth USD 1.1 billion[118]. Washington accused the Kremlin of undermining the Libyan state with fake banknotes[119]. The Russian Foreign Ministry replied that the contract to print Libyan dinars was signed in 2015 and that, ‘in the context of a de facto dual power in Libya, there are now two central banks’[120].

Accusations of Russia printing currency for General Haftar’s army have been made before. As Reuters reports, citing Russian customs data, between February and June 2019 Russia sent several shipments of Gosznak-printed paper money worth over $3 billion to Libya – shipments that coincided with the start of General Haftar’s offensive against the Government of National Accord. According to Reuters, between 2016 and 2019, Russia supplied around 13.5 billion dinars ($9.5 billion at current exchange rates)[121].

The Russian position is explained in three points: first, the money is printed on the orders of the eastern branch of the Central Bank of Libya (which is located in the territory controlled by Haftar’s army); second, the Libyan central bank in Tripoli (where Fayez al-Sarraj’s PNC Government of National Accord is based), does not demand that the money delivered to Haftar be recognised as counterfeit. Thirdly, the Goznak banknotes differ from those authorised by Tripoli in the position and colour of the number line[122].

Goznak and the digital rouble

The 1,000 rouble e-money project designed by Goznak[123]

State enterprise Goznak JSC Moscow is one of the world’s largest producers of banknotes, coins, stamps, identity cards, secure documents, state orders and medals[124]. It controls seven production sites in Russia (Moscow Printing Works, Moscow Printing Works, Moscow Mint, St Petersburg Mint, St Petersburg Paper Mill, Perm Printing Works, Krasnokamsk Paper Mill) and a research institute (Goznak Research Institute)[125]. It supplies more than 20 countries in Asia, Africa and Europe, and in 2014 exported over 3400 tonnes of banknote paper and over 1.1 billion printed banknotes – as well as producing passports and coins for export[126].

In September 2022, after the ‘referenda’ in the occupied Ukrainian territories, Goznak was included in the British government’s sanctions list. The company was accused of producing blank Russian passports for Ukrainian citizens[127]. Since 6 October 2022 it has been subject to sanctions by all EU countries for supporting Russian military aggression against Ukraine[128]. Since 2006, its General Director is Arkady Trachuk – former Head of the Energy Sales Department of the RAO UES of Russia[129].

Among the directors of the company are Olga Skorobogatova (member of the board of directors of the Russian central bank and member of the board of directors of some twenty western investment funds[130]), Andrey Kuryatnikov (Deputy Director General for Science and Development[131], is responsible for money printing, inspirer of a new material for coins, called ‘plamet’, which increases their resistance[132]), Yulia Goncharenko (Director of the Department for State Regulation of the Precious Metals and Precious Stones Industry[133]) and Alexander Markin (former Chief of Staff of Advisors to the Ministry of Finance[134])[135].

These people have long been discussing the possible introduction of the digital rouble, which, according to Olga Skorobogatova, is ‘urgently needed’. The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) started experimenting with the digital rouble in January 2022 and announced the success of the first transactions[136]. At least a dozen Russian financial institutions are participating in the experiments, which are expected to continue throughout 2022, after which CBR plans to start payment transactions for goods and services with the digital rouble[137].

As Russia struggles against the effects of Western sanctions, there is hope in Moscow for cryptocurrencies as a means to circumvent restrictions and finance international trade. In March 2022, the idea of making the digital rouble a reserve currency also circulated as a way to reduce Russia’s dependence on the US dollar, now that its foreign exchange reserves abroad are frozen[138]. In July 2022, already 12 banks were participating in the pilot project[139] and the monetary authority also received requests from various non-financial organisations. The central bank will have to develop cross-border interactions between the digital rouble and the digital currencies of other countries in order to make the Russian financial system more independent[140], especially from the SWIFT global control system[141].

The Dubai International Financial Center, home to the VTB bank and many companies linked to General Haftar[142]

Such a step would be truly revolutionary. Since the 1930s, in order to control the regularity of currency exchange and international money transfers, the world’s largest central banks founded the BIS Bank for International Settlements in Basel, which calculates every day how much money has been moved and in which currency – and in this way makes it possible to influence payments from any country to any other country[143]. In 1968, J.P. Morgan founded Euroclear in Belgium, which controls the global traffic of securities transactions, as well as the custody and assets of those securities[144] – a company which, as of 2000, has a competitor: Clearstream, a creature of Deutsche Bank[145].

The SWIFT code is the acronym for every transaction controlled by one of these three institutions – to date, any transaction taking place on the planet. If Russia were to leave the system, this would mean that control over trade with Moscow would disappear, and in the medium term that the other control systems of the capitalist system would also be superseded – without being replaced. From then on, the amount of money in circulation will be uncontrollable, as will its value. A prospect that creates considerable concern, as has already happened with the emergence of bitcoins. And it is no coincidence that most e-currencies are managed by Russian companies.

This step is necessary, and Putin knew this long before he invaded Ukraine, as evidenced by the preparations that began already in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea – such as the arrangements for commercial representation in Dubai made by the International Bank of Azerbaijan with Sberbank[146], which was the first step in the transfer of assets belonging to Sberbank and its clients (e.g. Istanbul’s DenizBank) to the Emirates NBD Bank[147]. This was followed by decisions such as the reduction of interest rates from 20 per cent to 9.5 per cent to prepare the Russian economy to move part of the assets to the Emirates or Switzerland[148] in view of Russia’s suspension from the SWIFT system[149] – a suspension that came on 10 March 2022 by the ISB[150].

Under these conditions, Russia urgently needs foreign currency to survive, it does not matter which country, as long as it is part of the SWIFT system and can be guaranteed by the gold deposited in Switzerland and the billions placed in the Emirates. Not only in Libya, but also in Yemen, Goznak started producing banknotes and coins and flooding the market[151]. In order to somehow control these tons of currency, Goznak founded a company in Abu Dhabi, whose name we still do not know[152]. What is known is that since China has also decided to support Haftar in order to create difficulties for the West, this is not through military engagement, but through support for the financial hub created by Goznak in the Emirates[153].

1 February 2018: Olga Skorobogatova announces that Russia intends to launch an alternative system to SWIFT, based on blockchains, based in the Emirates and valid for the entire community of Eurasian states[154]

One of the main managers of the Russian Mint, the aforementioned Olga Skorobogatova, worked feverishly to prepare the corporate network in the Emirates before the invasion of Ukraine began, so as to be sure of having an alternative route for business transactions in case, as was the case, the West created blacklists of economic sanctions[155]. This decision was followed by hasty transfers of Russian capital to Dubai[156], especially into the coffers of VTB Bank, which has its headquarters in the DIFC Dubai International Financial Center and continues to operate despite the sanctions, under the protection of the Emirati monarchy[157]. The Central Bank of Russia controls both Goznak, 50.1% of Sberbank, and 99.98% of VTB – partly directly, partly through the agency for the administration of state property, called Rosimushchestvo[158].

The idea of getting out of the world banking system is not new: back in 2011 Putin had already launched the idea of creating an alternative agency to the WTO for nations friendly to Russia, including Libya, which could give gold, oil or other assets as collateral for international transactions[159] – an idea that even then was liked above all by the global arms market, which prefers to deal with a country like Russia rather than the restrictive laws introduced over the years by the West[160].

Seen in this perspective, the role of the tiny dictator of Tobruk becomes that of a key pawn in a project of planetary proportions, within which Cyrenaica assures Russia, thanks to the intercession of the Emirates and the oil stored on the shores of the Mediterranean or in Dubai, the possibility of ignoring international sanctions and using them to create an alternative and parallel system to the one created in 1930 by Western countries. A project born one step at a time during Putin’s presidency, but one that has ancient roots, in those Soviet military schools where Haftar learned, along with other comrades, to work as a Russian double agent within the Western military, economic and political system.


[1] https://web.archive.org/web/20071208122147/http://www.un-museum.ru/projects/30/articles/kuznica.htm

[2] https://tass.ru/encyclopedia/person/haftar-halifa

[3] https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%92%D1%8B%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BB_(%D0%BA%D1%83%D1%80%D1%81%D1%8B_%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B0)

[4] https://web.archive.org/web/20071208122147/http://www.un-museum.ru/projects/30/articles/kuznica.htm

[5] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/russias-growing-interests-libya

[6] https://web.archive.org/web/20071208122147/http://www.un-museum.ru/projects/30/articles/kuznica.htm

[7] https://web.archive.org/web/20071208122147/http://www.un-museum.ru/projects/30/articles/kuznica.htm

[8] https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%92%D1%8B%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BB_(%D0%BA%D1%83%D1%80%D1%81%D1%8B_%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B0)

[9] https://warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=1050

[10] https://lechaim.ru/ARHIV/98/geyzer.htm

[11] https://fy.atomiyme.com/david-abramovich-dragunsky-biografy-karriere-nijsgjirrige-feiten/

[12] https://lechaim.ru/ARHIV/98/geyzer.htm

[13] https://lechaim.ru/ARHIV/98/geyzer.htm

[14] https://lechaim.ru/ARHIV/98/geyzer.htm

[15] https://lechaim.ru/ARHIV/98/geyzer.htm


[17] Dragunsky and KGB

[18] https://tass.ru/encyclopedia/person/haftar-halifa

[19] https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%92%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%8F_%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8_%D0%9C._%D0%92._%D0%A4%D1%80%D1%83%D0%BD%D0%B7%D0%B5

[20] https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9E%D0%B1%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%83%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B2,_%D0%93%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D0%98%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%87

[21] https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Military_academies_in_Russia

[22] https://en.minbarlibya.org/2019/04/11/who-is-khalifa-haftar-libyas-cia-linked-rogue-general-turned-warlord/

[23] https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/05/africa/libya-khalifa-haftar-tripoli-analysis-intl/index.html ; https://web.archive.org/web/20140519065411/http://www.philly.com/philly/news/nation_world/20140518_ap_b37be9896df04792a20297c0f382ce3b.html?c=r ; http://revolutionaryprogram.blogspot.com/2011_04_01_archive.html

[24] https://www.alestiklal.net/en/view/9636/khalifa-haftar-the-libyan-commander-who-is-close-to-cia-and-supported-by-the-counter-revolution-forces

[25] https://utro.ru/articles/2011/04/27/971571.shtml

[26] https://www.alestiklal.net/en/view/9636/khalifa-haftar-the-libyan-commander-who-is-close-to-cia-and-supported-by-the-counter-revolution-forces

[27] http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/04/04/libya.rebel.leader/index.html ; https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/libyan-warlord-haftar-cannot-claim-immunity-us-judiciary-says/news

[28] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/18/us/politics/hifter-torture-lawsuit-libya.html ; https://www.libyanamericanalliance.org/case-against-haftar

[29] https://www.alestiklal.net/en/view/9636/khalifa-haftar-the-libyan-commander-who-is-close-to-cia-and-supported-by-the-counter-revolution-forces

[30] https://english.alarabiya.net/perspective/profiles/2014/05/24/Old-CIA-links-return-to-haunt-Libya-s-Khalifa-Haftar ; https://www.libyanamericanalliance.org/case-against-haftar

[31] Velichko, born in 1945 in Azerbaijan into a Soviet military family is a retired Major General, from 1986 to 1991 Assistant Chief of the Directorate, Deputy Chief of Combat Service and Training, Acting Head of Division (HQ) of the Directorate of KGB Security Service: https://bezpekavip.com/lenta/veterani-kgb-9-valeriy-velichko

[32] https://yatakviju.mirtesen.ru/blog/43512360670/Otkroveniya-byivshego-ohrannika-Kaddafi-o-ego-zhenskoy-armii-i-o

[33] https://meduza.io/en/feature/2018/11/06/what-is-the-gru-who-gets-recruited-to-be-a-spy-why-are-they-exposed-so-often ; Истории спецслужб. Скрипаль поддерживал “зеленых человечков” – и стал следующим – новости Украины, Политика – LIGA.net

[34] https://www.linkiesta.it/2019/04/haftar-libia-scenari-sarraj-egitto-arabia-francia/amp/ ; https://www.rainews.it/articoli/2022/02/libia-lonu-continua-a-sostenere-abdelhamid-dbeibah-come-premier-f333539b-770f-42e7-ba7e-7bff5ffec064.html ; https://www.rainews.it/articoli/2022/05/libia-scontri-a-tripoli-dopo-larrivo-del-premier-designato-bashagha-b136de97-3c7b-40fb-8124-6991f41c6cae.html

[35] https://www.linkiesta.it/2019/04/haftar-libia-scenari-sarraj-egitto-arabia-francia/amp/

[36] https://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/Libia.pdf ; https://www.osservatoriosullefonti.it/archivi/archivio-rubriche/archivio-rubriche-2017/419-fonti-dell-unione-europea-e-internazionali/1840-osf-3-2017-int-3

[37] https://www.repubblica.it/politica/2022/07/29/news/migranti_elezioni_politiche_barconi_wagner-359574463/

[38] https://www.linkiesta.it/2019/04/haftar-libia-scenari-sarraj-egitto-arabia-francia/amp/

[39] https://www.swissinfo.ch/ita/libia–sarraj-accusa-la-francia–sostiene-il-dittatore-haftar/44917290 ; https://it.euronews.com/2020/07/06/il-petrolio-il-ciad-gli-emirati-libia-perche-macron-appoggia-haftar

[40] https://it.euronews.com/2020/07/06/il-petrolio-il-ciad-gli-emirati-libia-perche-macron-appoggia-haftar

[41] 2019.12.17 Eninco Trading Services Limited London; 2021.12.31 Eninco Trading Services Ltd. London; ENINCO TRADING LTD; GROUPE MADA SARL

[42] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-38643690

[43] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/russias-growing-interests-libya

[44] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-38643690

[45] https://news.ru/world/haftar-ocherednoj-vizit-palermo/ ; https://ria.ru/20190409/1552532653.html

[46] https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/cash-bound-for-libyan-strongman-is-seized.746277

[47] https://ria.ru/20161127/1482272875.html ; https://news.ru/world/haftar-ocherednoj-vizit-palermo/

[48] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-38643690

[49] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-38643690

[50] https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12108145%40egNews ; https://lenta.ru/news/2017/01/12/libya/

[51] https://www.rbc.ru/politics/01/02/2017/589207539a79473f44a5dfb0 ; https://vz.ru/news/2017/2/2/856272.html

[52] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/russias-growing-interests-libya

[53] https://www.dw.com/ru/%D1%87%D0%B5%D0%B3%D0%BE-%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%B5%D1%82%D1%81%D1%8F-%D0%B2-%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%B8-%D0%B3%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BB-%D1%85%D0%B0%D1%84%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80/a-48223032

[54] https://www.aa.com.tr/ru/%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80/%D1%81%D0%B2%D1%8F%D0%B7%D0%B8-%D0%B3%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B0-%D1%85%D0%B0%D1%84%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B0-%D1%81-%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B5%D0%B9-%D1%83%D1%85%D0%BE%D0%B4%D1%8F%D1%82-%D0%BA%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BD%D1%8F%D0%BC%D0%B8-%D0%B2-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%88%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B5-/1696190#

[55] https://meduza.io/en/feature/2018/11/06/what-is-the-gru-who-gets-recruited-to-be-a-spy-why-are-they-exposed-so-often

[56] https://ria.ru/20180202/1513834267.html ; https://www.kp.ru/daily/25664/825870/ ; https://meduza.io/en/feature/2018/11/06/what-is-the-gru-who-gets-recruited-to-be-a-spy-why-are-they-exposed-so-often

[57] https://news.liga.net/world/news/usilit-vliyanie-moskva-otpravila-300-vagnerovtsev-v-liviyu ; https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/sukhankin_russian_military_contractors_africa_ru_2020.pdf

[58] https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2022/05/06/rossiya-nachala-perebrosku-voisk-iz-sirii-v-ukrainu-a20203

[59] https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/7448072/russia-missiles-libya-warlord/

[60] https://www.dw.com/ru/the-sun-%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%BE%D0%B1%D1%89%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%B0-%D0%BE-%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B5-%D1%80%D1%84-%D0%B2-%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%8E-%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%86%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%B7%D0%B0-%D0%B3%D1%80%D1%83-%D0%B8-%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BF%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B2-%D1%81-300/a-45819147

[61] https://www.perild.com/2022/09/02/the-final-stage-of-the-russian-championship-in-karting-was-moved-from-the-annexed-crimea-after-the-explosions-in-saki-putins-grandson-should-take-part-in-the-race/

[62] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-49019951

[63] Molenkade on Nexis

[64] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/russias-growing-interests-libya

[65] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/03/03/russian-mercenaries-back-libyan-rebel-leader-moscow-seeks-influence/

[66] https://www.csis.org/analysis/moscows-next-front-russias-expanding-military-footprint-libya

[67] https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/libyan-prime-minister-arrives-russia

[68] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/russias-growing-interests-libya

[69] https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/liviya-boi-v-tripoli-ili-prizrak-novoy-grazhdanskoy-voyny/

[70] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/03/03/russian-mercenaries-back-libyan-rebel-leader-moscow-seeks-influence/

[71] http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202005290008 ; https://www.dw.com/ru/%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%BB%D1%8C-%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD-%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%88%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%82%D1%8C-%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B5-%D0%B1%D0%B0%D0%B7%D1%8B-%D0%B2-%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B8/a-53624803

[72] https://www.dw.com/ru/%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B9-%D0%BF%D1%83%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BD-%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D1%81%D0%B4%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%82-%D1%85%D0%B0%D1%84%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B0/a-53648756

[73] https://www.dvidshub.net/image/6220921/russia-deploys-military-fighter-aircraft-libya ; https://www.dw.com/ru/%D1%81%D1%88%D0%B0-%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%8F%D1%8E%D1%82-%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%8E-%D0%B2-%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B1%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B5-%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B1%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%B9-%D0%B2-%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%8E/a-53573504

[74] https://www.trtrussian.com/novosti-rossiya/rossiya-prodolzhaet-vooruzhat-naemnikov-v-livii-2709166

[75] https://www.trtrussian.com/novosti-rossiya/dhrf-v-livii-razmesheny-rossijskie-regulyarnye-vojska-6154270

[76] https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/13316131

[77] https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/liviya-boi-v-tripoli-ili-prizrak-novoy-grazhdanskoy-voyny/

[78] https://en.minbarlibya.org/2020/03/08/libyan-fuel-smuggling-a-swiss-trader-sailing-through-troubled-waters-3/

[79] https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/police-did-not-check-whether-suspected-money-laundering-legitimate.934984

[80] https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/100700/enemed_tanks_stored_smuggled_libyan_oil_brought_by_debonos_ships_investigation#.Y2QrS3bMLIV

[81] https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/82121/debono_used_false_certificates_and_maltese_notarys_signature_to_gain_ministry_stamp#.Y2QwUXbMLIV

[82] https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/81526/libyans_long_warned_of_maltese_mafia_smuggling_fuel_across_the_mediterranean#.Y2QwonbMLIV ; https://manueldelia.com/2020/11/darren-debono-alleged-fuel-smuggling-king-in-custody/

[83] https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/100700/enemed_tanks_stored_smuggled_libyan_oil_brought_by_debonos_ships_investigation#.Y2QrS3bMLIV ; https://manueldelia.com/2020/11/darren-debono-alleged-fuel-smuggling-king-in-custody/

[84] https://manueldelia.com/2020/11/darren-debono-alleged-fuel-smuggling-king-in-custody/

[85] https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/82332/smuggling_kingpin_got_libyan_politicians_stamp_of_approval_for_fuel_exports#.Y2QxCHbMLIV

[86] https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/100700/enemed_tanks_stored_smuggled_libyan_oil_brought_by_debonos_ships_investigation#.Y2QrS3bMLIV

[87] https://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2018-02-26/local-news/Darren-Debono-and-other-Maltese-listed-in-US-Treasury-sanctions-6736185349?src=ilaw

[88] https://meduza.io/feature/2019/10/01/ssha-i-malta-zapodozrili-rossiyu-v-sotrudnichestve-s-neftyanymi-kontrabandistami

[89] https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/96268/russia_blocks_malta_smuggling_sanctions_on_darren_debono#.Y2Q6W3bMLIV

[90] https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/malta-no-longer-seeking-sanctions-against-alleged-oil-smuggler-gordon.727234

[91] https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/police-did-not-check-whether-suspected-money-laundering-legitimate.934984

[92] https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/half-of-satabanks-transactions-were-highly-suspicious.700280 ; https://meduza.io/feature/2019/10/01/ssha-i-malta-zapodozrili-rossiyu-v-sotrudnichestve-s-neftyanymi-kontrabandistami ; https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/business/business_news/97719/americans_told_scicluna_of_concerns_about_russian_cash_in_satabank?fbclid=IwAR3CjgMmjjgsixZAMylUAPv7FNxcI6pykip4GpKMzRzHJih3N1K6zTyr4Yc#.Y2Q8AHbMLIX

[93] https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/satabank-ordered-not-to-take-further-deposits-into-customers-accounts.692076

[94] https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/satabank-fined-a-record-3-million-over-money-laundering-breaches.720001

[95] KB INVESTMENTS LIMITED Corporate Family Tree

[96] INOVEST LIMITED Corporate Family Tree

[97] Gordon Debono indicted

[98] https://theshiftnews.com/2020/11/26/police-take-action-on-gordon-and-yvette-debono-one-year-after-the-horse-bolted/


[100] 2021.12.31 Eninco Trading Services Ltd. London

[101] Rival Eastern Libyan Firm Claims Ready to Sell Crude

[102] 2019.12.17 Eninco Trading Services Limited London

[103] https://ng-check.com/cheyne-petroleum-limited/2696397.html

[104] 2021.06.30 Pillar Resources Limited London

[105] https://www.societe.com/societe/plasti-dore-331904417.html

[106] Fleet Energy Inc. Panama and Dubai

[107] Haftar and Gaddafi_s spy chief meet secretly in Cairo

[108] https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/court_and_police/104458/fiau_warning_lawyers_can_launder_criminal_monies_through_sham_litigation#.Y2XJEOSZO3A ; https://lovinmalta.com/news/suspected-maltese-oil-smuggler-is-moving-e2-8-million-through-offshore-companies-with-his-wifes-help/ ; https://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/98413/court_thwarts_bid_to_stop_satabank_15m_release_to_dirty_oil_suspect#.Y2XJReSZO3A

[109] https://www.banknoteworld.com/libya-1-dinar-banknote-2013-nd-p-76-unc.html

[110] https://www.ng.ru/world/2017-10-25/6_7102_livia.html

[111] https://www.ng.ru/world/2017-10-25/6_7102_livia.html

[112] https://www.ng.ru/world/2017-10-25/6_7102_livia.html

[113] https://www.ng.ru/world/2017-10-25/6_7102_livia.html

[114] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-52861307

[115] https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/cash-bound-for-libyan-strongman-is-seized.746277

[116] https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/cash-bound-for-libyan-strongman-is-seized.746277

[117] https://www.rbc.ru/finances/30/05/2020/5ed215739a7947ca2fb28d91

[118] https://archive.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4143562?fbclid=IwAR21JdraXbHIi27lO4xk7zoPRW947Qe_WI_d76TjS8H-AjsvN84c_ckp91I

[119] https://www.dw.com/ru/%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B9-%D0%BF%D1%83%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BD-%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D1%81%D0%B4%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%82-%D1%85%D0%B0%D1%84%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B0/a-53648756

[120] https://archive.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4143562?fbclid=IwAR21JdraXbHIi27lO4xk7zoPRW947Qe_WI_d76TjS8H-AjsvN84c_ckp91I

[121] https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-52861307

[122] https://www.dw.com/ru/%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BC%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B9-%D0%BF%D1%83%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BD-%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D1%81%D0%B4%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%82-%D1%85%D0%B0%D1%84%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B0/a-53648756

[123] https://www.istockphoto.com/fr/photo/cryptocurrency-digital-or-bitcoin-composant-%C3%A9lectronique-informatique-et-billet-de-gm914629442-251729722

[124] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2022:259I:FULL&from=EN , pag. 95

[125] https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%93%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BA

[126] http://goznak.ru/about/press/news/12679/

[127] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-collaborators-of-russias-illegal-sham-referendums

[128] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2022:259I:FULL&from=EN , pag 95

[129] https://whoiswho.dp.ru/cart/person/878607

[130] https://www.cbr.ru/about_br/skorobogatovaon/

[131] https://www.publish.ru/news/201704_20089797

[132] https://coinsweekly.com/plamet-a-new-material-for-coin-mass-production/

[133] https://russianjeweller.ru/!_news/2021/06/otrasl_21_06_23_04.html

[134] https://uvelir.info/news/28986/

[135] https://goznak.ru/about/today/management/ ; https://inndex.ru/ul/sankt-peterburg/ogrn-1167847225281-2b1-ao-goznak

[136] https://news.bitcoin.com/digital-ruble-much-needed-russias-central-bank-says-wont-delay-testing/

[137] https://news.bitcoin.com/digital-ruble-much-needed-russias-central-bank-says-wont-delay-testing/

[138] https://news.bitcoin.com/digital-ruble-much-needed-russias-central-bank-says-wont-delay-testing/

[139] https://coingeek.com/russia-pushes-plans-for-digital-ruble-to-replace-swift/

[140] https://news.bitcoin.com/bank-of-russia-accelerates-schedule-for-digital-ruble-project/

[141] https://coingeek.com/russia-pushes-plans-for-digital-ruble-to-replace-swift/

[142] https://www.arabianbusiness.com/industries/banking-finance/422471-difc-based-finance-firm-has-licence-suspended-by-regulator

[143] https://www.bis.org/about/index.htm

[144] https://www.euroclear.com/en.html

[145] https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/pol/activ/clearing/html/index.en.html

[146] https://www.sberbank.com/investor-relations/ir/news/article?newsID=200006324-1-2&blockID=7&regionID=77&lang=en&type=NEWS

[147] https://www.emiratesnbd.com/en/media-centre/media-centre-info/?mcid_en=780

[148] https://www.bullionstar.com/gold-university/central-bank-gold-policies-bank-russia

[149] https://www.wionews.com/world/central-bank-of-russia-hikes-key-rate-to-20-from-95-amid-sanctions-457421

[150] https://english.alarabiya.net/business/banking-and-finance/2022/03/10/Bank-for-International-Settlements-suspends-Bank-of-Russia- ; https://www.dlapiper.com/es/spain/insights/publications/2022/03/explaining-swift-and-recent-actions/ ; https://www.zawya.com/en/markets/currencies/russias-central-bank-downplays-role-of-dollar-euro-at-home-and-globally-mct25m8f

[151] Yemen currency clash deepens crisis in war-torn country

[152] Goznak in the Emirates; https://academic.oup.com/book/41882/chapter-abstract/354711127?redirectedFrom=fulltext

[153] UAE implicates China in Libya conflict – Emirates Leaks ; The Geopolitics of China’s Libya Foreign Policy (chinamed.it)

[154] https://banks.am/en/news/fintech/15026

[155] Olga Skorobogatova in the Emirates

[156] https://www.vox.com/world/23283965/russia-sanctions-united-arab-emirates-dubai-emirates-finance-money-yachts

[157] https://www.privet-russia.com/russian-banks-dubai-uae/

[158] http://www.compromat.ru/page_10394.htm ; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Bank_of_Russia#Subsidiaries

[159] Russian presidential aide interviewed on economy

[160] Russian arms exporters_ performance_ defence industry integration efforts viewed

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